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15.1  Introduction 
A currency board, first introduced in the British colony of Mauritius in 1849, 
is a rule-based monetary institution that is rather different from a central bank. 
Although there are variations, a typical currency board has two essential char- 
acteristics. First, the board has the obligation to exchange on demand local 
currency for some major international currency, which is often called the re- 
serve currency, and vice versa, at a fixed exchange rate stipulated in the legisla- 
tion. Second, local currency is issued based on at least 100 percent reserve of 
securities denominated mainly in the reserve currency. 
Since the nineteenth century, dozens of  currency boards had been estab- 
lished in British colonies and other places, often in response to monetary or 
exchange rate disturbances.  However, when these colonies became indepen- 
dent nations after World War 11,  most decided to replace the currency board 
with a central bank. Very few currency boards survive today. Some people may 
be inclined to believe that this form of monetary institution has already lost 
its practical importance. This judgment is premature. Recently, Argentina and 
Estonia have enacted laws to establish currency boards, which have also been 
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1. For more detailed discussion of  the history of  currency boards, see Schwartz (1993) and 
Hanke and Schuler (1994). See also Walters and Hanke (1992). 
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recommended for Russia, Bulgaria, and other nations in Eastern Europe (see 
Hanke, Jonung, and Schuler 1993). The currency crisis of  Mexico in  1995 
has further stimulated people to consider the system seriously. If this renewed 
interest could be sustained and these countries were to adopt currency boards 
eventually, then as Schwartz (1993) has commented, “a watershed would have 
been reached in the annals of political economy.” 
Do the potential benefits of currency boards outweigh their costs in these 
countries? Some of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of currency 
boards are well known.2 For example, convertibility of currency is guaranteed 
and there is little or no uncertainty about the exchange rate. On the other hand, 
in times of domestic liquidity crisis, a currency board arrangement cannot act 
as a lender of last resort. In theory, its reserve currency can only be used to buy 
local currency or foreign securities. It would be a violation of its basic principle 
if the reserve were to be used to purchase the assets of a domestic bank suffer- 
ing from a run.3  Moreover, since a currency board is a rule-based arrangement, 
active discretionary monetary policies are precluded. Whether this macroeco- 
nomic self-discipline is regarded as an advantage, however, is more contro- 
versial. 
To assess the viability of adopting currency boards as monetary institutions, 
we should not satisfy ourselves with theoretical discussions alone. Since they 
have been in existence for almost one and a half centuries, a more fruitful 
approach is to analyze rigorously the empirical data generated from actual ex- 
perience. This literature is generally lacking. In this paper, we shall analyze 
the macroeconomic implications of a currency board regime using Hong Kong 
data and methods developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993, 1994). The viability of the regime is also discussed. 
In section 15.2 we shall briefly discuss the historical background of Hong 
Kong’s currency board and argue why its experience provides us with a unique 
natural experiment to evaluate some aspects of the system. In section 15.3 we 
shall outline the structural vector autoregressive model implemented in this 
paper. Section 15.4 presents the quantitative results and their interpretations. 
Section 15.5 summarizes some general properties and implications about cur- 
rency boards that we have learned from the Hong Kong experience. 
2. Williamson (1995) provides a useful summary of the advantages and disadvantages of cur- 
rency boards. 
3.  The currency board of Hong Kong is an exception to this rule. There is no formal legislation 
prohibiting the board from using its foreign exchange to purchase domestic assets, although the 
board has so far refrained from doing so in a significant way. See the balance sheet in table 15.7. 
One interpretation is that the legislature provides an “escape clause” under which the board can 
act as a lender of last resort during financial crises. As long as the escape clause is only invoked 
in truly exceptional and justifiable situations, it will not jeopardize the credibility of the currency 
board. See Persson and Tabellini (1990) for an illustration and discussion of escape clause models. 
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15.2  Historical Background of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 
The currency system of Hong Kong, following that of China, was based on 
the silver standard in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries: 
In  1934, the United States decided to buy silver at a very high fixed rate, and 
that led to large outflows of  silver from Hong Kong and China. As a result, 
both governments abandoned the silver standard. In December 1935, Hong 
Kong enacted the Currency Ordinance, later renamed the Exchange Fund Ordi- 
nance, and purchased all privately held silver coins. At the same time, the note- 
issuing banks, which were private enterprises, had to deposit their silver re- 
serves with  the newly created Exchange Fund  and received certificates of 
indebtedness (CIS)  in return. The Exchange Fund sold the silver in the London 
market for sterling. From then on, if an authorized bank wanted to issue more 
notes, it was obligated to purchase more CIS from the Exchange Fund with 
sterling at a fixed rate of HK$16 per pound. The Exchange Fund would also 
buy the CIS from the banks if the latter decided to decrease the money supply. 
Thus the monetary system had all the features of a currency board, with the 
exception that legal tenders were issued by authorized private banks rather than 
directly by the board. 
The peg to sterling lasted for more than three decades, despite four years of 
interruption during World War 11. In 1967, because of devaluation of sterling, 
the HK$16 peg could no longer be sustained. In July  1972 further pressure 
from the devaluation of  sterling forced the eventual abolition of the link be- 
tween sterling and the HK dollar. The latter was pegged to the U.S. dollar at a 
rate within an intervention band. This also did not last long. Again devaluation 
of the U.S. dollar and an inflow of capital to Hong Kong led to the decision to 
free-float the HK dollar against the U.S. dollar. The currency board system was 
no longer operating. 
Under the free-floating system from  1974 to  1983, authorized banks still 
had to purchase CIS,  which at this time were denominated in HK dollars, from 
the Exchange Fund if they wanted to issue more notes. The fund maintained 
an account with these banks. The payment for the CIS  was simply a transfer of 
credit from the banks to the account of the Exchange Fund. Starting from May 
1979, the note-issuing banks were required to maintain 100 percent liquid asset 
cover against the fund‘s short-term deposits. This cover did not imply that the 
Exchange Fund  could effectively limit the creation of  money  because the 
banks could borrow foreign currency to obtain the liquid assets. Money growth 
in this period was higher and more volatile than before. In 1978, the govern- 
ment also decided to transfer the accumulated HK dollar fiscal surplus to the 
Exchange Fund, which has since then become the government’s de fact0 sav- 
ings account. 
4.  For more details on the historical development of the monetary regime in Hong Kong, see 
Greenwood (1995), Nugee (1995), and Schwartz (1993). 406  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
During the initial phase of the free-floating period, the HK dollar was very 
strong. However, from 1977 onward, it was subject to considerable downward 
pressure. The trade deficit was growing. Money supply, M2, increased at the 
rate of almost 25 percent a year, mainly because of even faster growth in bank 
credit. The start of Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong in 
1982 led to a series of  financial crises: stock market crash, real estate price 
collapse, runs on small banks, and rapid depreciation of the HK dollar. On 17 
October 1983, the government decided to abolish the interest-withholding tax 
on HK dollar deposits and, more important, to go back to the currency board 
system. The exchange rate was fixed at U.S.$l = HK$7.8. Banks issuing notes 
had to purchase CIS  with U.S. dollars at this rate from the Exchange Fund. The 
reserves accumulated were invested mainly in interest-bearing U.S.  govern- 
ment  securities. Table  15.1 summarizes the  historical  evolution  of  Hong 
Kong’s monetary institutions. 
Several new changes to the currency board system of Hong Kong, now pop- 
ularly known as the “linked exchange rate system,” were introduced. In  1988, 
the Exchange Fund established new “accounting arrangements,” which in ef- 
fect empowered it to conduct open market operations. Legislative changes also 
allowed the government more flexibility in manipulating interest rates. Since 
March 1990, the fund was permitted to issue several kinds of “Exchange Fund 
bills,” which were similar to short-term Treasury bills. In 1992, a sort of dis- 
count window was opened to provide liquidity to banks. The Hong Kong Mon- 
etary Authority (HKMA) was established in December 1992 to take over the 
power of  the Exchange Fund Office and the Commissioner of  Banking. The 
HKMA has since been active in adjusting interbank liquidity in response to 
changes in demand conditions. 
Several remarks should be made here. First, the monetary  institution in 
Hong Kong has not been a static system. In less than half  a century, it has 
evolved from the silver standard, to a currency board with sterling being the 
reserve currency, then to a free-floating regime, and finally back to a currency 
board with a U.S. dollar link. More recently, as Schwartz (1993) has observed, 
there has been  some “dilution” of  the features that  distinguish a currency 
board. Given historical hindsight, one can hardly believe that the present sys- 
tem will last forever, despite persistent assurances by the Hong Kong govern- 
ment that the linked exchange rate is there to stay permanently. This view is 
supported by the observation that historically no fixed exchange rate could be 
sustained for a very  long peri~d.~  This motivates us to simulate in section 
15.4.4 the conditions under which the Hong Kong currency board may col- 
lapse. 
Second, from 1974 to now, Hong Kong has used two polar cases of  mon- 
5. Eichengreen (1994) casts doubt on the future of  any pegged exchange rate regime in the 
twenty-first century. He predicts that only the two extremes of flexible exchange rate and monetary 
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Table 15.1  Exchange Rate Regime for the Hong Kong Dollar 
Date 
Until 4 Nov 1935 
6 Dec 1935 
23 Nov 1967 
6 July 1972 
14 Feb 1973 
25 Nov 1974 
17 Oct 1983 
Exchange Rate Regime  Reference Rate 
Silver standard 
Pegged to sterling 
Fixed to U.S. dollar with 22.25%  intervention 
Free float 
Pegged to U.S. dollar 
€1 = HK$16 
f 1 = HK$14.55 
U.S.$l  = HK$5.65 
U.S.$l  = HK$5.085 
U.S.$l = HK$7.80 
band around a central rate 
Source: Nugee (1995) 
etary systems, namely, free floating (1974-83)  and currency board (1983- 
present). There have been no other economic institutional changes of a com- 
parable order of  magnitude. The government still follows the “positive non- 
interventionism” policy formulated more than two decades ago. It has been 
persistently  keeping  the  size of  the  government small  and  leaving small 
budgetary surpluses in most fiscal years. It has also refrained from using fiscal 
policy as a fine-tuning tool. The legal system has remained intact, and Hong 
Kong’s economic freedom has always been rated at the highest level by interna- 
tional agencies. These similarities between the two periods provide us with a 
relatively homogeneous setting in which to conduct a natural controlled exper- 
iment to compare the implications of the two systems. 
Third, while structural homogeneity is needed for a controlled experiment 
on the one hand, sufficiently rich data variation is necessary for statistical pur- 
poses on the other. If the economic conditions of the two periods had remained 
perfectly stable, the data would hardly contain enough information for infer- 
ring the macroeconomic performance of the two systems. We need to observe 
how the two regimes respond to external shocks. Indeed, Hong Kong as a small 
open economy is extremely sensitive to external shocks, which may  over- 
shadow the “treatment effect” of  a currency board  system. Fortunately, by 
adopting the approach in Blanchard and Quah (1989), it is possible to isolate 
the supply and demand shocks during the two periods. Counterfactual simula- 
tions can be performed to identify the effects of  the change in monetary re- 
gime. 
Fourth, Hong Kong has gone through a number of major economic shocks 
from 1974 to now. This period covers the time span of several business cycles. 
There have also been big swings in real estate and stock markets. The quarterly 
data available are reasonably rich in variations that allow us to make meaning- 
ful inferences. 
Last, the economic health and significant financial strength of Hong Kong 
provide an almost ideal situation to test the vulnerability of a currency board 
system when it is confronted with a crisis. At the end of 1996, foreign currency 
assets in the Exchange Fund amounted to U.S.$69.55 billion, the world’s sev- 408  Yum K. Kwan  and Francis T. Lui 
enth largest reserve. The ratio of foreign currency assets in the Exchange Fund 
to currency in circulation was almost six. The value of the government’s accu- 
mulated fiscal reserve was also substantial. In fact, it was contributing 27 per- 
cent of the Exchange Fund (see HKMA 1997). If simulations show that Hong 
Kong’s currency board will face a crisis when it is subject to shocks of  speci- 
fied magnitude, it is hard to imagine that the currency board in a country with 
poorer economic health can survive in the same scenario. 
15.3  Empirical Model 
In this section, we discuss a framework that will be used to compare the 
macroeconomic performances of the flexible and linked exchange rate regimes 
when they are subject to exogenous shocks. To properly take into account the 
heterogeneity induced by these shocks, we adopt Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) 
approach to identify them explicitly. 
Our  empirical framework  is the  structural vector  autoregression (VAR) 
model initiated by Blanchard and Watson (1986), Sims (1986), and Bernanke 
(1986). Following Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993, 1994), we formulate a bivariate model in output growth and inflation 
rate to identify two series of structural shocks: (1) those that have only tran- 
sitory effects on the output level and (2)  those that have permanent effects on 
the output level. Shocks of  the first type are interpreted as demand shocks 
originating from innovations in the components of  aggregate demand, while 
the second type are supply shocks originating from innovations in productivity 
and other factors that affect aggregate supply. This distinction is crucial for 
solving the identification problem discussed below. We  now briefly describe 
the model and refer the reader to the above references and the surveys in Gian- 
nini (1992) and Watson (1994) for details. 
Let XI = (Ay,, Ap,)’, where y, and p,  denote the logarithms of  output and 
price level, respectively. XI  is assumed to be covariance stationary and have a 
moving average representation of the form 
(1)  XI - p = Boer + B,e,-, + B2e,-2  +  . .  .  5  B(L)e,, 
where e, = (edtr  eJ’  is a bivariate series of  serially uncorrelated shocks with 
zero mean and covariance matrix Q  B(L) =  B, +  B,L  + B2L2  + ... is shorthand 
notation for the matrix polynomial in backshift operator L, and p is the mean 
of XI. Equation (1) is taken to be structural in that ed,  and es, have behavioral 
interpretations as the demand shock and supply shock, respectively. The coef- 
ficient matrices in B(L) capture the propagation mechanism of  the dynamic 
system. In particular, the (i, j)  element of B, is the kth-step impulse response of 
the ith endogenous variable with respect to a one unit increase in the jth shock. 
Equation (1) is not directly estimated. We  proceed in the following steps. 
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where {u,} is a bivariate series of serially uncorrelated errors with zero mean 
and covariance matrix Z and A(L)  is a matrix polynomial in L. Second, we 
invert the estimated autoregressive polynomial in equation (2)  to obtain the 
Wold moving average representation, which is the reduced form of equation 
(1): 
(3)  x,  - p = u, + c,u,-,  + C2ut-2  +  '.'  = C(L)u,. 
Again, C(L) = I + C,L + C2L2  +  is shorthand for the matrix polynomial 
as stated. In our implementation the reduced form VAR  is estimated with six 
lags and the Wold representation in equation (3)  is expanded up to 200 lags, 
which is more than adequate. Given estimates of the reduced form parameters 
C(L)  and Z and the reduced form residuals uf, is it possible to recover the 
structural parameters B(L)  and R and the structural residuals e,? This is a clas- 
sical identification problem in simultaneous equations models, and the answer 
is yes provided that enough a priori restrictions have been placed on the struc- 
tural parameters. By comparing equations (1) and (3) it can be checked that 
the structural and reduced forms are related by the following relationships: 
(4)  BOe,  = u,,  forallt, 
(5)  B,=C,B,,  j=O,1,2  ,..., 
Equations (4)  and (5) imply that the structural form in equation (1) can be 
recovered from the reduced form in equation (3)  once B, is determined. Thus 
the identification problem boils down to imposing sufficiently many restric- 
tions so that B, can be solved from equation (6). 
In our bivariate system, there are seven structural parameters in B, and a, 
but only three reduced form parameters in 2;  we thus need four restrictions to 
just-identify the structural model. The first three restrictions come from assum- 
ing R to be the identity matrix. The zero-covariance restriction dictates that 
the two structural shocks are uncorrelated, implying that any cross-equation 
interaction of the two shocks on the dependent variables is captured by the lag 
structure in B(L).  The two unit-variance restrictions imply that B, is identified 
up to multiples of the two standard deviations. Thus B, has the interpretation 
of being the jth-step impulse response with respect to a one standard deviation 
innovation in the structural shocks. The last restriction comes from Blanchard 
and Quah's  (1989) idea of restricting the long-run multiplier. Since demand 
shocks are assumed to have no permanent effects on output level, this trans- 
lates into the restriction that the long-run multiplier (i.e., the sum of impulse 
responses) of demand shocks on output growth must be zero; that is, 
(7)  BIl(1)  = B,,,, + B,,,, + B,,,, +  .  . .  = 0, 410  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
where Bll(l)  and Bll,j  are the upper left-hand comers of B(l) and Bj, respec- 
tively. 
To see how equation (7) can be translated into a restriction on B,,  let J be 
the lower triangular Cholesky factor of c and notice that equation (6)  can be 
written as (after assuming fl = I) 
(8)  Bogo  = 2  = JJ’. 
Thus B,  can be determined from J up to an orthogonal transformation S; that is, 
(9)  B,  = JS,  SS’  = 1 
Orthogonality implies that S (up to one column sign change) must be of the 
form 
Equations (5) and (9) imply 
(1 1)  B(l) = C(l)B,  = HS,  H = C(1)J 
Equation (7) then implies a restriction 
which determines a and hence S. Once S is found, B,  can be determined by 
equation (9). Given B,,  the structural parameters and the structural shocks can 
then be recovered from the reduced form via equations (4) and (5). 
The output and price data are quarterly Hong Kong real per capita GDP (in 
1990 prices) and the corresponding GDP deflator from 1975:  1 to 1995:3,  taken 
from various issues of  Estimates of  Gross Domestic Product and Hong Kong 
Monthly Digest of  Statistics, published by the Hong Kong  Both 
output and price series exhibit strong seasonality, and they are deseasonalized 
before use by  a spectral method by  Sims (1974) and implemented in Doan 
(1992, sec. 11.7). The full sample is divided into two halves corresponding to 
the two exchange rate regimes: the free-floating period straddles 1975:  1-83:3 
and the currency board period covers 1983:4-95:3. 
15.4  Results and Interpretations 
In this section, we present the empirical results and interpret them. In partic- 
ular, we use these results to compare the macroeconomic performance of the 
free-floating and currency board regimes from several perspectives. 
6. Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1995, various issues-b). Quarterly population 












Fig. 15.1  Macroeconomic performance data 
Nore: A, per capita real GDP growth rate (percent). B, inflation rate (percent). 
15.4.1  Institutional Effect or Environmental Effect? 
Figure 15.1 displays the data for the full sample period, covering both the 
free-floating and currency board regimes. It can be seen that both inflation and 
output growth are somewhat more stable during the currency board years than 
in the free-floating years. More precisely, the standard deviations of  output 
growth rates during the free-floating and currency board years are 2.94 and 
2.23, respectively, and those of  the inflation rates are 1.55 and 1.05, respec- 
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Table 15.2  Summary Statistics of Vector Autoregression  Estimation 
Statistic 
VAR  1: (Free Floating) 
output  Inflation  output  Inflation 
VAR 2: Currency Board 
Growth Rate  Rate  Growth Rate  Rate 
R2  0.35  0.53  0.35  0.43 
D.W.  1.7  1.58  2.01  1.97 
Ljung-Box Q  [0.42]  [0.88]  [0.86]  [0.12] 
Overall significance”  [0.01]  [0.001] 
Data range  1975:l-83:3  1983:4-95:3 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
aReports the p-value  of  a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that all regressors in the 
system (except the constant terms) are zero. 
What is behind the observed reduction in volatility in both output growth 
rates and inflation rates? Some believe that this simply reflects a more conge- 
nial international environment during the 1980s than in the 1970s. On the other 
hand, advocates of  fixed exchange rates and currency boards, including the 
Hong Kong government, sometimes argue that this is due to the inherent supe- 
riority of the linked exchange rate regime over the free-floating system (e.g., 
see Sheng 1995). Granted that both arguments are reasonable and neither can 
be rejected a priori, it is then necessary to disentangle the “institutional effect” 
from the “environmental effect.” In our structural VAR  model, the structural 
parameters Bj play the role of institution, and the structural shocks u, represent 
the external environment. By estimating two separate structural models for the 
two exchange rate regimes, we obtain two sets of structural parameters repre- 
senting two institutions and two sets of shocks representing two different exter- 
nal environments. We  show below that both the parameters and the shocks 
have changed. 
Table 15.2 reports the summary statistics of the estimations for equation (1) 
in section 15.3 under the free-floating and currency board regimes. It can be 
seen that they are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respec- 
tively. The estimated parameters for the structural equation (1) are different 
across the two regimes. This is evident from a likelihood ratio version of the 
Chow test, which rejects the null hypotheses of no structural change at the 5 
percent level.’ The result supports the Lucas critique. We  need to use a differ- 
ent set of  structural parameters to capture the institutional effect due to a 
change in the monetary regime. It is assumed, however, that these parameters 
are invariant under exogenous shocks. 
Figure 15.2 presents the quarterly demand and supply shocks (1975-95)  that 
7. The likelihood ratio statistic LR = -2(lnL0 -  InL, -  InL,)  = -2(699.76 -  291.85 - 
428.66) = 41.5 rejects the null hypothesis of no structural change at the 5 percent level according 
to a chi-squared distribution with 26 degrees of freedom. The terms In Lo,  In L,,  and In L, are the 
log likelihood values of  the VARs  estimated by  using the full sample (1975:l-95:3), the free- 
floating period (1975:  1-83:3), and the currency board period (1983:4-95:3),  respectively. 413  Hong Kong's Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
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Fig. 15.2  Demand (A)  and supply (B)  shocks 
are identified by using the econometric framework in section 15.3. Table 15.3 
reports summary statistics for the shocks. By the skewness and kurtosis tests, 
one can observe that both types of  shocks during the free-floating period ex- 
hibit substantial nonnormality, which can be attributed to a few large negative 
shocks. The skewness of the shocks can be clearly discerned from their empiri- 
cal distributions, depicted in figure 15.3.*  Shocks during the currency board 
8. The empirical distribution is obtained by  matching the first four sample moments with  a 
Gram-Charlier expansion. See Johnson and Kotz (1970, 15-20). 414  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
Table 15.3  Characteristics  of Structural Disturbances 
Demand Shocks  Supply Shocks 
Characteristic  Free Floating  Currency Board  Free Floating  Currency Board 
Skewness  -1.01  [0.003]  -0.18  [0.57]  -0.91  [0.008]  -0.31  [0.34] 
Kurtosis  4.50 [0.03]  3.47 [0.38]  4.69 [0.01]  2.91 [0.95] 
Maximum  1.84  2.40  1.97  2.04 
Minimum  -3.17  -2.69  -3.06  -2.64 
Notes: Skewness (by)  = m,/m:/2 and kurtosis (b,) = m,/m;, m,  is the kth sample moment around 
the mean. Numbers in brackets arep-values for testing either population skewness = 0 (symmetry) 
or kurtosis = 3 (normal shape). 
= x  (1 + 3/n + 91/4n2) -  (3/2n)(l - 111/2n) 
(x’ -  3x) -  (33/8nZ)(x5  - lox’  + 15x) is approximately distributed as N(0,l) under the null 
hypothesis, where x = bin(n - 1)/[6(n -  2)11’*  and n is the sample size. The approximate normal- 
ity is very accurate even in a small sample, see Kendall and Stuart (1958,298). 
For testing kurtosis = 3, the test statistic z = y[(n -  I)(n -  2)(n -  3)/24n(n + ])]In  is approxi- 
mately distributed as N(0,I)  under the null hypothesis, where y = [n2/(n - I)(n -  2)(n  -3)] 
[(n + I)m, -  3(n - l)m?Js4  and s is the sample standard deviation (with divisor n - 1). See 
Kendall and Stuart (1958,305-6). 
For testing symmetry, Fisher’s test statistic 
period, on the contrary, show no strong evidence against normality, as is clear 
from the skewness and kurtosis tests and their empirical distributions. 
This indicates that the two exchange rate regimes are subject to exogenous 
shocks of different characteristics. Simply comparing the macroeconomic per- 
formance in the two periods without properly controlling for the environmental 
effect can be misleading. This forces us to use better methods. 
15.4.2  Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions 
The relative importance of demand and supply shocks changes dramatically 
across the two exchange rate regimes. This is demonstrated by  the results on 
variance decomposition of the shocks and the estimated values of the impulse 
responses. 
Table 15.4 shows the percentages of variance in output growth rate and in- 
flation that can be explained by the demand shocks in the last n quarters, where 
n is the number in the extreme left-hand column. The percentages explained 
by  the supply shocks are given by  100 minus the table entries. Table 15.5 is 
similar to table  15.4 but shows the variance in  output level and price level 
explained. As  can be readily seen, during the free-floating regime, demand 
shocks explain little of the variations in output growth and level, but a substan- 
tial fraction of inflation or price  movement^.^ On the other hand, supply shocks 
can account for most of the output changes, but little of the price fluctuations. 
9. The values in the “output level” columns of table 15.5 decline when n becomes larger. This 
is because the variance of output level explained by  demand shocks must converge to zero in the 
long run. Readers are reminded that in section 15.3, we have built in the identifying restriction 
that demand shocks have no long-term effects on output level. 415  Hong Kong's Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
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Fig. 15.3  Density functions of demand (A)  and supply (B)  shocks 
Note:  Free-floating period (solid  line) and currency board period (dashed line). 
In the currency board regime, the results are different. Demand shocks can 
explain much of the variations in the output and price series, at least in the 
short run. The movements explained by the supply shocks are also substantial. 
The dynamic impulse responses of output and price with respect to demand 
shocks are consistent with the variance decomposition results above. In figure 
15.4,  the impulse responses, or cumulative effects of demand shocks on output 416  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
Table 15.4  Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Explained by Demand Shocks 
Output Growth Rate  Inflation Rate 














































Note:  The corresponding percentages explained by  supply shocks are given by  100 minus the 
table entries. 
Table 15.5  Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Explained by Demand Shocks 
Output Level  Price Level 














































Note:  The corresponding percentages explained by  supply shocks are given by  100 minus the 
table entries. 
and price during the last n quarters, are plotted against n.'O The response of 
output is both smaller and shorter in duration under the flexible exchange re- 
gime. On the other hand, the response of price level under the currency board 
regime is smaller than that under the free-floating system. 
Figure 15.5, depicts the impulse responses of  output and price to supply 
shocks, respectively. The effects of supply shocks on price level across the two 
regimes are negative, a result consistent with simple economics. The impact 
of  supply shocks on price level in the currency board regime appears to be 
bigger than that under the free-floating regime. Supply shocks, however, have 
smaller effects on output during the currency board years. These results are 
also consistent with the patterns in variance decomposition. 
10. The magnitude of  the demand shock in each period is one standard deviation. 417  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
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What can we draw from the variance decomposition and impulse response 
exercises? In fact, the results can be interpreted in a convenient way. The aggre- 
gate supply curve during the free-floating years is very steep. It flattens in the 
subsequent period. The aggregate demand curve, on the other hand, has a rela- 
tively flat slope under the free-floating regime. It steepens in the currency 
board years. These changes in the slope explain why the Chow test detects a 
structural shift in the model. 
Why has the aggregate supply curve, or more properly, the short-run supply 
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Fig. 15.4  Response to demand shocks: output (A) and price (B) 
Note: Free-floating period (plain  fine) and currency board period (boxed line). 418  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T.  Lui 
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Fig. 15.5  Response to supply shocks: output (A) and price (B) 
Note:  Free-floating period (plain line) and currency board period (boxed line). 
ilar pattern for the industrial countries over the past hundred years. The expla- 
nation does not necessarily lie in the adoption of  a currency board. After all, 
during part of the sample period studied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen, coun- 
tries were moving from fixed exchange to free floating, while Hong Kong was 
heading in the opposite direction. The flattening of  the short-run aggregate 
supply curve indicates that there are more nominal rigidities. Probably the lat- 
ter are due to increases in labor legislation and union influences in Hong Kong 
since the 198Os.lL 
11. A number of laws on labor protection have been introduced since the 1980s. These range 
from long-service payment, severance compensation, leaves for pregnant female workers, etc. 419  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
The steepening of the aggregate demand curve under the currency board can 
be usefully analyzed by  a simple textbook model (Sachs and Larrain  1993, 
chaps. 13 and 14). In a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in the domestic 
price will hurt exports and increase imports. The underlying IS curve of  the 
economy will shift to the left. Since a small open economy has to face a given 
world interest rate, the LM curve will have to adjust endogenously so that it 
intersects the IS curve at the level equal to the world interest rate. The decline 
in output due to the increase in price, and hence the slope of  the aggregate 
demand curve, is therefore completely determined by  the magnitude of  the 
movement of the IS curve. In the case of a free-floating regime, an increase in 
price causes the LM  curve to move to the left. The changes in the exchange 
rate and price will then lead to an adjustment of the IS curve so that it intersects 
the LM  curve at an interest rate equal to the prevailing world interest rate. This 
time the slope of the aggregate demand curve depends on how responsive the 
LM  curve is to an increase in price. In general, the slope of the aggregate de- 
mand curve under a currency board can be either steeper or flatter than that 
under a free-floating system, depending on the relative responsiveness of the 
IS and LM  curves to a change in price level. It appears that the IS curve in 
Hong Kong is not as sensitive to price change as the LM curve. Thus the aggre- 
gate demand curve is steeper under the currency board regime.I2 
We  can draw the following conclusions from the results above. Output in 
Hong Kong under a currency board seems to be less susceptible to supply 
shocks, which are usually not induced by  government short-term policies. 
However, demand shocks do cause greater short-term volatility in output under 
the currency board system. If a government with a currency board is able to 
discipline itself to pursue a stable and predictable fiscal policy, the volatility of 
the economy may be lower than that under a free-floating system. An explana- 
tion of why Hong Kong’s economy has been less volatile after the adoption of 
the linked exchange rate is that stable fiscal policy has always been the philoso- 
phy of the financial branch of its government. 
15.4.3  Counterfactual Simulations 
As discussed in subsection 15.4.1, the two periods under consideration are 
subject to shocks with different properties. One way  to compare the perfor- 
mance of the two regimes is to consider the following two cases: 
Case I.  What would have happened to the economy if  the currency board 
Case 2. What would have happened to the economy if the free-floating sys- 
To answer the question in case 1, we apply the demand and supply shocks 
of  1975-83  to equation (1) estimated for the currency board regime and com- 
system were adopted from 1975 to 1983? 
tem were adopted from 1983 to 1995? 
12. It can be shown by  a simple calibrated model that the IS curve in Hong Kong is not as 
responsive to price change as the LM curve. 420  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
Table 15.6  Counterfactual Simulations 
Case 
Output Growth Rate (%)  Inflation Rate (%) 
Mean  Standard Deviation  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Case 1: 1975-83 
Actual (free floating)  1.54  2.94  2.07  1.55 
Simulated (currency board)  1.27  2.46  1.82  1.21 
Actual (currency board)  1.22  2.23  1.94  1.05 
Simulated (free floating)  1.51  2.79  2.13  1.36 
Case 2:  1983-95 
pare the simulated results with the actual time path. To answer the question in 
case 2, we  do the simulations in a similar way,  but this time we  apply the 
shocks of  1983-95  to equation (1) for the free-floating regime. The approach 
is based on the assumption that the supply and demand shocks identified in the 
estimation procedure of section 15.3 are invariant under change in exchange 
rate regime. This exogeneity assumption makes a lot of sense for Hong Kong. 
In this small open economy whose external sector is much larger than its GDP, 
most supply and demand shocks are external. The government has been fol- 
lowing the same stable fiscal policy throughout the two periods under consider- 
ation. Moreover, there is no central bank in Hong Kong to determine the money 
supply, which is largely rule based in both regimes and automatically adjusts 
to external shocks. Thus there is no a priori reason to believe that the supply 
and demand shocks are regime dependent. 
The counterfactual exercise amounts to replacing the structural residual e, 
in equation (1) with a hypothetical residual ef  and then simulating a new data 
path XT, given structural parameters p  and B(L).  For example, in case 1, e,, p, 
and B(L)  are the residual and structural parameters for the free-floating regime, 
while e,? is taken to be the residual for the currency board regime. In practice, 
however, the moving average representation in equation (1) is difficult to work 
with. We  instead perform the simulation by equation (2) with a reduced form 
residual uf constructed from ef  via equation (4). It is straightforward to check 
that our two-step procedure is equivalent to a direct simulation of equation (1). 
Summaries of these counterfactual simulations are presented in table 15.6. 
The results show that if  the currency board system were adopted in the first 
period, the average growth rate would have declined, but inflation would have 
gone down zlso. Since the standard deviations are also lower, we can say that 
both output growth and inflation would have been more stable. The patterns 
for the second period are similar. The cost of a currency board system is lower 
output growth. However, there are also benefits. The inflation rate decreases, 
and the economy is less volatile. The trade-off is transparent when the compar- 
ison is in terms of levels (rather than growth rates) as depicted in figures 15.6 
and 15.7. 
The counterfactual simulations disentangle the effects of regime shift and 421  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
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Fig. 15.6  Case 1: output (A) and price (B)  levels (in log) 
Note: Actual (free floating; plain line) and simulated (currency board; boxed line). 
changes in the external environment. As an  example, consider the reduction in 
output growth volatility when the monetary system changes from free floating 
to currency board. The standard deviation of output growth rates goes down 
from 2.94 to 2.33, a roughly 32 percent reduction in volatility. From simulation 
case 1, we see that if the currency board system were adopted in the environ- 
ment of the 1970s, output volatility would have declined to 2.46, a 20 percent 
reduction from 2.94. This implies that 62.5 percent of the reduction in output 
volatility that we actually observe from the data is due to the adoption of the 422  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
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Fig. 15.7  Case 2: output (A) and price (B)  levels (in log) 
Nore: Actual (currency board plain line) and simulated (free floating; boxed line). 
currency board, while the remaining 37.5 percent is due to a more tranquil 
external environment in the 1980s. Similarly, the marginal effect of  the cur- 
rency board on inflation volatility is to reduce it from 1.55 to 1.21, or about 28 
percent. The observed reduction, however, is from 1.55 to 1.05, or a decline of 
48 percent. One can then make the following decomposition. The difference 
in external environment during the 1970s and 1980s accounts for 42 percent 
of the reduction in inflation volatility, while the change in the monetary regime 
explains the remaining 58 percent of the reduction. 423  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
15.4.4  Currency and Banking Crises 
The Hong Kong government has been vehemently claiming that the Ex- 
change Fund is financially strong and the linked exchange rate will be de- 
fended. As can be seen from the balance sheet of the fund in table 15.7, Hong 
Kong indeed owns one of  the largest foreign reserves in the world. Does it 
mean that the HK$7.8 link is immune to crisis? In theory, because of the 100 
percent backup, a crisis would not occur even if people exchanged all the cur- 
rency for foreign assets. However, one should note that at the end of  1996, 
total M3 equaled HK$2,586 billion, more than five times the foreign currency 
assets in the fund. Of this M3,41.2 percent is in bank deposits denominated in 
foreign money (see HKMA 1997). Suppose people decide to change the port- 
folio of M3 by exchanging HK dollar deposits for foreign money. If the change 
is big enough, the banking sector must  sell its domestic assets for foreign 
money to avoid bank runs. It is not clear whether the fund is willing to buy 
these domestic assets. However, the Exchange Fund Ordinance does allow the 
financial secretary the flexibility to do so even though Hong Kong’s monetary 
institution is a currency board.I3  Suppose the Exchange Fund will indeed pro- 
vide the foreign liquidity to avoid bank runs. If people decide to increase their 
foreign exchange holdings from 41.2 to 47.9 percent of M3, the accumulated 
earnings in the balance sheet of the fund will disappear. If the foreign deposits 
ratio goes up further to 53.5 percent, the entire fiscal reserve will also be used 
These rather simplistic calculations tell us that a run on the HK dollar could 
occur even when the change in people’s portfolio holdings is not exceptionally 
big. We  do not have an estimate of portfolio holdings as a function of other 
variables. However, one can reasonably speculate that the confidence in the 
HK dollar will suffer significantly and the link will face a crisis if the fiscal 
reserve is completely used up. 
The amount of fiscal reserve is affected by shocks to the economy. Since the 
Hong Kong government has been following a reasonably stable fiscal policy, 
we focus our attention here on supply shocks. How big are the supply shocks 
if  the fiscal reserve is to be eliminated? This can be answered by  making use 
of the empirical estimates in this paper. 
The long-run impulse response of  the logarithm of  y(t) with respect to a 
supply shock of  one standard deviation is 0.0143. This means that a one- 
up.14 
13. The Exchange Fund Ordinance, Section 3(2), states, “The Fund, or any part of it, may be 
held in  Hong Kong currency or  in foreign exchange or in gold or  in silver or  may be invested by 
the Financial Secretary in such securities or other assets as he, after having consulted the Exchange 
Fund Advisory Committee, considers appropriate” (HKh4A 1994,51).  See also n. 3 above. 
14. After  1 July  1997, the  money accumulated in the Land  Fund will be handed over to the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. This fund, which amounts to roughly 
HK$120 billion, is generally regarded as part of the fiscal reserves of Hong Kong. Thus the finan- 
cial strength backing up the Hong Kong dollar could be further enhanced. China also promises to 
use its own foreign reserves to support the HK  dollar in case of emergency. Table 15.7  Exchange Fund Balance Sheet (millions of HK dollars) 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Assets 
Foreign currency assets  149,152  192,323  225,333  274,948  335,499  384,359  428,547  493,802 
HK dollar assets  9,625  3,874  10,788  12,546  12,987  24,126  32,187  40,715 
Total  158,777  196,197  236,12 1  287,494  348,486  408,485  460,734  534,5  17 
Liabilities 
Certificates of indebtedness  37,191  40,79 1  46,410  58,130  68,801  74,301  77,600  82,480 
Fiscal reserve account  52,546  63,226  69,802  96,145  115,683  13 1,240  125,916  145,898 
Coins in circulation  2,012  2,003  2,299  2,559  2,604  3,372  3,597  4,164 
Exchange Fund bills and notes  0  6,67  1  13,624  19,324  25,157  46,140  53,125  83,509 
Balance of banking system  978  480  500  1,480  1,385  2,208  1,762  474 
Other liabilities  1,603  39 1  4,834  3,220  7,314  22,614  38,600  45,130 
Total  94,330  113,562  137,469  180,858  220,944  279,875  300,600  361,655 
Accumulated earnings  64,447  82,635  98,652  106,636  137,542  128,610  160,134  172,862 
Sources: HKMA (1994, 1995,  1997). 425  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
Table 15.8  Postshock Output Level (percent of preshock output) 
Size of Negative Supply Shock 
(in standard deviations) 
Duration 

































standard-deviation shock will reduce output permanently by  1.43 percent, 
other things being equal. Thus we  can calculate the postshock output level 
y(t)* by the formula 
y(t)*  = (1 - 0.0143x)y(t) 
for a supply shock of x  standard deviations. Similarly, for K periods of negative 
supply shocks, each of size x, the postshock output level should be 
y(t)*  = (1 - O.O143~)~y(t). 
In table 15.8, we calculate the percentages, lOO(y(t)*/y(t)),  for x = 1, 2, 3, 
4 and K  = 1, 2, . . . , 8. From data for  1985-94,  the average ratios of  total 
government expenditure and revenue to GDP are 16 and 16.8 percent, respec- 
tively (see Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, various issues-a). 
We assume that the revenue ratio is fixed. Postshock revenue is 
O.I68y(t)*  = [0.168(1 - 0.0143~)~]y(t). 
Thus the effect of the supply shock on revenue is equivalent to a “tax cut,” 
with the new effective tax rate being the term inside the brackets above. The 
effect is shown in table 15.9. From GDP data, we can infer that each percent- 
age point decline in the revenue-output ratio will reduce revenue by  HK$12 
billion. Making use of table 15.8, one can come up with results in different 
scenarios. For example, if  there are negative three-standard-deviation supply 
shocks lasting for two years, the loss in revenue every year will be approxi- 
mately HK$5 1.6 billion. It only takes about three years for the fiscal reserve 
to be completely depleted if political pressures prohibit the government from 
reducing its expenditures accordingly. Since major historical changes in Hong 
Kong’s future are upcoming, large negative supply shocks or perhaps even sig- 
nificant structural shifts in the transition period cannot be ruled out. The stabil- 
ity of the currency board system in the future has yet to be tested. 
Currency crises can lead to bank runs. But bank runs can occur for other 426  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
Table 15.9  Postshock Effective Revenue-Output Ratio (percent) 
Size of  Negative Supply Shock 
(in standard deviations) 
Duration 

































reasons too. Since the typical currency board does not provide a lender of last 
resort, bank runs are often regarded as the Achilles’ heel of the system. Indeed, 
banking crises did occur in Hong Kong a number of times, all during the cur- 
rency board years. The government and the banking system resorted to several 
ways to deal with them. 
In  1994 there were 180 licensed banks in Hong Kong,  16 of  which were 
owned mostly by local shareholders (HKMA 1994,90-91).  Government poli- 
cies toward runs on local banks and foreign banks seemed to be different. The 
government did not attempt to support Citibank in 1991 when rumors caused 
a short-lived run, nor did it try to rescue the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International’s Hong Kong branch before its collapse in the same year. How- 
ever, it moved to take over two small local banks in the mid-1960s and three 
more in the period 1982-86. It also provided some emergency funds to support 
five banks in the same period, four of which were later acquired by others. The 
note-issuing banks also played an important role in cushioning the shocks from 
the runs. They supported one bank in 1961 and three in 1965-66,  and took 
over three more in the same period. Thus, in the 1960s, the government relied 
mainly on the financially strong note-issuing banks to either lend to or take 
over troubled local banks. In more recent years, the government seemed to have 
resorted to the Exchange Fund for playing the role of lender of last re~0rt.I~ 
This is another reason to say that some of the features of a currency board have 
been diluted in Hong Kong. 
15.5  What Can We  Learn from Hong Kong’s Experience? 
The performance of the currency board in Hong Kong has not been bad so 
far. Although it may have lowered output growth, inflation has also gone down. 
15. See Jao (1991, chap. 13) and Ho, Scott, and Wong (1991, chap.  1) for more details about 
banking crises in Hong Kong. 427  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and  Changing Monetary Regimes 
In fact, the more revealing results from the counterfactual exercises concern 
stability. When both regimes are subject to the same exogenous shocks, output 
and prices are less volatile under a currency board. 
The stability result is not general. Simulations on impulse responses show 
that output is less sensitive to supply shocks under a currency board than under 
a free-floating regime. On the other hand, demand shocks can cause stronger 
short-term volatility in output in a currency board system. The relative stability 
in output in Hong Kong to a large extent must have come from the govern- 
ment’s self-discipline in fiscal policy, which is based on two rules: maintaining 
a balanced budget or small surplus and keeping government size small. Other 
countries without a stable rule-based fiscal policy may not succeed in reducing 
output volatility even if they have currency boards.16 
The fiscal restraint affects not only output stability but also the credibility 
of the exchange rate system. A weakness of the currency board system is that 
people may doubt the determination and capability of the government to main- 
tain perfect convertibility at the specified rate. The conservative fiscal policy 
has been instrumental in creating surpluses in almost every budgetary year. 
Without the significant fiscal reserve, confidence in the HK dollar may suffer. 
In recent years, since the Exchange Fund has been acting as if  it could be a 
lender of last resort, its financial strength, which is partly supported by a large 
fiscal reserve, is all the more important. Perhaps one reason why fiscal policy 
in Hong Kong is coordinated with its monetary system is that the financial 
secretary has the authority to control both. 
Despite the financial strength of the Exchange Fund, the HK dollar has oc- 
casionally been subject to considerable speculative pressure. For example, in 
mid-January 1995, the HK dollar depreciated 0.4 percent briefly. On all such 
occasions, the speculations have been effectively countered (HKMA  1995). 
Given the excellent track record, do people have enough confidence in the HK 
dollar? As mentioned in subsection 15.4.4, 46.2 percent of M3 is in deposits 
denominated in foreign currency. This large portion is an indication that people 
only have limited confidence in the future of the HK dollar, in spite of all the 
assurance the government has provided. 
Should other countries adopt the currency board system? The above analysis 
indicates that the decent performance in Hong Kong has been due to a combi- 
nation of favorable factors, and yet, the possibility of monetary collapse cannot 
be ruled out. It is doubtful that many countries have equal or better conditions. 
16. The financial secretary of Hong Kong articulated his commitment to noninterventionist rule- 
based fiscal policy by referring to a story in Greek mythology. The half-bird, half-woman Sirens 
sang so  beautifully that  all sailors who heard them would dive into the sea and try to swim to 
them, only to drown and die at their feet. He said that he would tie himself to the mast of the ship 
when he heard them singing. See Tsang (1995). 428  Yum  K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
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COIIUIlent  Barry Eichengreen 
Currency boards are at one end of  the spectrum between monetary policy 
credibility and monetary policy flexibility. They maximize the commitment 
to stable policy at the expense of  all ability to tailor monetary conditions to 
macroeconomic and financial circumstances. Governments that attach a high 
shadow price to credibility are attracted to this option. For example, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, Argentine policymakers, burdened by  their country’s 
succession of failed battles with inflation and prepared to take drastic steps to 
establish their anti-inflationary credibility, resorted to a currency board. Esto- 
nia, Lithuania, and eventually Bulgaria were attracted to the arrangement by 
the special monetary difficulties of the transition to the market and, in the first 
two cases, of proximity to an unstable Russia. 
Whether their examples should be emulated by other countries is a contested 
issue. Although currency boards were advocated for Russia following the dis- 
solution of the Soviet Union and for Mexico following its financial meltdown 
in 1995, in both cases there was also resistance to the proposal, and policymak- 
ers ultimately shunned the arrangement on the grounds that they could not 
afford the sacrifice of policy flexibility it entailed.’ 
Unfortunately,  systematic empirical analysis of  these issues is difficult. 
While all countries are special, the circumstances of those that have opted for 
currency boards tend to be so unusual as to render hazardous all attempts at 
generalization. Most modem currency boards are so recent or short-lived that 
there exist only a very few years of  time-series data on their operation, af- 
fording little opportunity for systematic econometric work. 
Here is where the case of  Hong Kong’s  currency board comes in. Hong 
Bany Eichengreen is the John L. Simpson Professor of Economics and Political Science at the 
University of California, Berkeley, and a research associate of the National Bureau of  Economic 
Research. 
1. Prominent advocates of currency boards in these contexts are Hanke, Jonung, and Schuler 
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Kong operated a currency board vis-&vis sterling from 1935 through the early 
197Os, at which point the instability of sterling led it to sever that link. It then 
floated until  1983, when  the turbulence associated with  negotiations with 
China over the colony’s future led to a confidence crisis, to which the govern- 
ment responded by reestablishing the currency board, this time with a peg to 
the U.S. dollar. Thus the last two decades divide into a pair of 10-year periods, 
one of floating and one featuring a currency board, over which the comparative 
performance of alternative monetary arrangements can be analyzed and com- 
pared.* 
A logical starting point is to compare price, output, and interest rate behavior 
under the two regimes. But because global economic conditions also differ 
across periods, and a small, dependent economy like Hong Kong is especially 
sensitive to the external environment, such comparisons tell us little about the 
performance of  Hong Kong’s  monetary arrangements narrowly defined. To 
address this problem, Kwan and Lui utilize a variant of the structural vector 
autoregression methodology of  Blanchard and Quah, distinguishing macro- 
economic disturbances, which they attribute to the global environment, from 
subsequent adjustments, which they interpret in terms of the structure of the 
Hong Kong economy. 
The disturbances identified by their structural VAR approach are intuitively 
plausible and readily interpretable in terms of historical events. For example, 
there is a large permanent shock (a “negative supply disturbance”) around the 
time of OPEC 11.  The 1983 crisis provoked by  the negotiations with China 
shows up as a negative shock with both temporary and permanent components. 
The “tequila effect” in early 1995 shows up as a negative temporary shock. 
The presumption that temporary shocks should raise prices while permanent 
shocks should reduce them is not imposed in estimation but is supported by the 
results, consistent with the authors’ interpretation of permanent and temporary 
disturbances in terms of aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks, re- 
~pectively.~ 
Still, one can question whether these estimates are in fact useful for distin- 
guishing the effects of  global economic shocks from the operation of  Hong 
Kong’s monetary regime. Domestic policy, and not just the external environ- 
ment, is a source of  shocks; and prominent among the potential sources of 
2. Admittedly, Hong Kong’s experience is special as well. Its currency board is permitted to 
engage in open market operations, and since 1992 a sort of discount window has been opened to 
provide liquidity to the banks. Neither  feature is typical of  currency boards.  Moreover, Hong 
Kong’s Exchange Fund holds massive excess foreign currency reserves, including the cumulated 
fiscal surpluses of the government. (A third of the Exchange Fund‘s  foreign assets come from this 
source.) Together, these facts blunt the trade-off that typically exists between a currency board 
arrangement and lender-of-last-resort operations. I would have liked to see the authors discuss 
how distinctive they consider Hong Kong’s currency board arrangements, and how far they think 
the lessons of its experience can be generalized. 
3. Note that this restriction  is not imposed in estimation. It is a feature of the Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen  (1993)  implementation  of  the  structural  VAR  approach,  but  not  of  the  original 
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domestic disturbances is monetary policy, especially in the 1973-82  period 
when the Hong Kong dollar was floating. For this reason the attribution of 
shocks to external factors and responses to internal factors is unlikely to be 
strictly ~orrect.~ 
Other authors have attempted to distinguish demand shocks of internal and 
external origin by estimating larger dimension systems identified by the impo- 
sition of  additional long-run restrictions (see, e.g., Erkel-Rousse and Melitz 
1995). The identifying restrictions required to render this exercise feasible are 
somewhat arbitrary, and cautious econometricians may be reluctant to impose 
them. Nonetheless, it is difficult to pass judgment on the operation of  Hong 
Kong’s currency board in the absence of such an analysis. 
The  authors interpret their  impulse response  functions in  terms  of  the 
Mundell-Fleming model. This is a peculiar choice, since Mundell considered 
the behavior of output and interest rates, taking prices as fixed, while the au- 
thors’ empirical analysis focuses on output and prices without considering in- 
terest rates. It would be more straightforward and informative to describe the 
results in terms of the textbook aggregate-supply-aggregate-demand model- 
that is, in terms of  output and prices themselves. From this perspective, the 
authors’ findings make intuitive sense. They suggest that supply shocks have 
had a smaller impact effect on prices and a larger impact effect on output in 
the currency board years. This of course is just what one would expect: shifts 
in the aggregate supply curve trace out the slope of  the aggregate demand 
curve, and under fixed rates the latter will be very flat in price-output space, 
domestic prices being tied to foreign prices. Demand shocks, on the other 
hand, have larger short-run output effects in the currency board years than un- 
der a floating system. Since shifts in the aggregate demand curve trace out the 
short-run aggregate supply curve, the results suggest that the latter has become 
flatter over time, reflecting the growth of  nominal rigidities5 This interpreta- 
tion is consistent with recent commentary bemoaning the declining flexibility 
of Hong Kong’s labor market. 
An  implication is that Hong Kong’s  decision to eliminate exchange rate 
4.  In fact, the authors are not entirely consistent in their attribution of shocks to the external 
environment and responses to policy. At one point they note that supply shocks are less prevalent 
in the currency board years and identify this as one of the advantages of a currency board. It is 
peculiar to identify supply shocks with government policy, however, especially insofar as they 
emanate from the monetary sector, in which case their effects should only be temporary. What 
they are likely to be picking up, obviously, is the effect of the two OPEC oil shocks and the 
commodity price boom of 1974-75-a  more turbulent global economic environment prior to the 
reestablishment of the currency board, in other words. 
5. Interestingly, this is precisely what Tam Bayoumi and I (Bayoumi and Eichengreen  1996) 
found on the supply side when estimating the same model using annual data for the industrial 
countries spanning the past hundred years: short-run aggregate curves grow flatter over time, as if 
nominal rigidities grow more important. But we also found that aggregate demand curves grew 
steeper, as more and more countries moved in the direction of greater exchange rate flexibility to 
facilitate the use of demand management policies to offset the effects of  supply disturbances, 
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flexibility (in terms of the U.S. dollar) may have had significant costs in terms 
of the sacrifice of monetary autonomy. As disturbances have come to increas- 
ingly affect output rather than prices, the government has acquired a growing 
incentive to use monetary policy to offset the effects of shocks, something for 
which greater exchange rate flexibility is required. Indeed, many other coun- 
tries have moved in the direction of  greater flexibility, as predicted.6 Mean- 
while, Hong Kong has moved the opposite way, with the government tying its 
hands precisely as the value of policy flexibility has grown. The implication is 
that Hong Kong has paid a price for its monetary policy credibility. 
Next, Kwan and Lui challenge the view that Hong Kong’s currency board is 
immune from attack because international reserves are five times the monetary 
base. As the authors note, although reserves are five times the base, M3 is five 
times reserves. (Here is one indication of Hong Kong’s importance as a finan- 
cial center: bank deposits are 25 times as large as currency in circulation!) It 
is entirely possible for a shift out of bank deposits, or even a relatively modest 
shift from HK dollar to U.S. dollar deposits, to deplete the Exchange Fund of 
reserves and cause the collapse of the currency peg. 
Whether investors have an incentive to run on the Exchange Fund’s reserves 
by  shifting out of  domestic currency deposits in favor of U.S. dollar deposits 
depends on the monetary policy they expect to be pursued in the aftermath of 
the event. If  they think that policy will be more inflationary than before, they 
have an incentive to attack. This could be the case if  they anticipate that the 
Chinese government will under certain circumstances compel the Hong Kong 
authorities to run more expansionary policies now that the colony has been 
returned to their jurisdiction. It could happen if  an attack itself heightens the 
suspicions of  the Chinese authorities about the advisability of  the currency 
board arrangement and leads them to plump for a more expansionary policy.’ 
Thus only if  the authorities can credibly commit to continuing to run the 
same monetary policies as the United States will Hong Kong’s currency board 
be immune from attack. Given the questions that inevitably surround Beijing’s 
policies toward Hong Kong, this is anything but certain. Just as Argentina’s 
currency board was no guarantee of exchange rate and monetary stability when 
the tequila effect was felt in early 1995 (and the dilemma of having to chose 
between the stability of the exchange rate and the stability of the banking sys- 
tem was obviated only by  the injection of  $8 billion of  assistance from the 
IMF), the existence of a currency board will be no guarantee of monetary sta- 
bility. 
All of  the above was written in mid-1996 as a comment on the authors’ 
conference draft and, in fairness to Kwan and Lui, left largely unchanged. But 
a commentator reading page proofs two years later cannot resist adding a few 
6. As late as 1984 only a quarter of International  Monetary Fund (IMF)  member countries had 
gone over to floating rates. But by the end of  1994 the proportion operating systems of  managed 
and independent floating rates had risen to more than 50 percent. 
7. This last-mentioned situation is modeled by  Obstfeld (1986). 433  Hong Kong’s Currency Board and Changing Monetary Regimes 
thoughts suggested by the Asian economic and financial crisis. For one thing, 
those events have considerably accelerated the transition to greater exchange 
rate flexibility in the region, a transition that, I argued above, is an inevitable 
consequence of  the multilateralization of  trade and the rise in international 
capital mobility. For another, events in Asia have fanned the controversy over 
the merits of currency boards. In particular, academics and policymakers are 
deeply split over the advisability of a currency board for a country like Indone- 
sia in the throes of an economic, financial, and political crisis. My own reading 
of the debate is that a currency board is appropriate  only under the most excep- 
tional economic and financial circumstances, as emphasized above, but also 
only when there exists broad-based political support  for moving to one extreme 
on the trade-off between policy credibility and policy flexibility. Indonesia is 
not such a case. On the other hand, Hong Kong, where a return to managed 
money would raise uncomfortable questions about who is ultimately respon- 
sible for the management, qualifies on all these grounds. Finally, the events of 
1997-98,  which included a series of increasingly fierce attacks against the HK 
dollar by hedge funds and others, confirm that a currency board is no guarantee 
of insulation against speculative attacks. 
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Comment  Zhaoyong Zhang 
It is a great pleasure for me to read and comment on Kwan and Lui’s paper on 
Hong Kong’s currency board and changing monetary regimes. In this paper, 
Zhaoyong Zhang  is a lecturer in the Department of Economics and Statistics at the National 
University of Singapore. 434  Yum  K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
the authors attempt to assess the viability of adopting currency boards as the 
monetary institution by  analyzing the macroeconomic implications of  a cur- 
rency board regime using Hong Kong data. They show that a currency board 
is less responsive to supply shocks but more to demand shocks than a floating 
rate system. The viability of the current exchange rate regime in Hong Kong 
relies on a stable fiscal policy. 
It has widely been recognized that exchange rate policy plays a key role in 
determining economic performance in developing countries. While in prin- 
ciple exchange rates could be left to be determined by free market forces based 
on fundamentals, this has hardly been seen in the less developed economies 
in the past few decades. Most developing countries, especially the small and 
medium-sized countries, made a return in the 1980s to fixed exchange rates 
after the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s as a corner- 
stone of their monetary disinflation programs. This has raised some interesting 
issues concerning the selection of exchange rate regime. Kwan and Lui’s paper 
thus draws a useful lesson from a study of Hong Kong’s experience, enhancing 
our understanding of currency boards and the selection of  exchange rate re- 
gime. 
In less than half a century, the exchange rate regime in Hong Kong has 
evolved from the silver standard (since the last century till 1935),  to a currency 
board with sterling being the reserve currency (1935-73),  then to a floating 
system (1974-83),  and finally back to a currency board with a U.S.  dollar 
link since 1983. An interesting question associated with the evolution of  the 
exchange rate regime will be how long the current system can last. In other 
words, what will be the future exchange rate regime in Hong Kong? Kwan and 
Lui have conducted some simulation exercises and conclude that a stable fiscal 
policy is the key to preventing the current exchange rate system from exper- 
iencing a crisis. Hong Kong’s  success in sustaining a pegged rate under a 
currency board arrangement depends on its specific conditions: it is small, 
open, and well integrated with the world economy, with a high degree of wage- 
price flexibility in which nominal magnitudes can adjust readily to exogenous 
shocks. But one has to recognize that a policy regime appropriate for ending 
high inflation may well be inappropriate for long-run economic management 
(see Sachs 1996). Examples are the 1992-93  European Exchange Rate Mecha- 
nism (ERM) crises and the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. Moreover, the effect of 
Hong Kong’s return to China after 1997 on the credibility of the current system 
and on the confidence of people in Hong Kong’s future prosperity cannot be 
undervalued. 
The experience of  some transition economies in Eastern Europe indicates 
that a pegged exchange rate is much more efficient at stabilizing the economy 
than a floating rate. Estonia stabilized with a pegged exchange rate under a 
currency board arrangement, while Latvia initially relied on a floating ex- 
change rate. As a matter of fact, both countries succeeded in ending high infla- 
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excessively high real interest rates and less confidence in the stability of the 
currency (Sachs 1996). Offsetting this observation, the simulation results from 
Kwan and Lui show that output growth under a currency board system is lower 
than under floating rates. Returning to the transition economies, it has been 
observed that in Estonia GDP in  1993, 1994, and  1995 grew -7,  6, and 6 
percent, respectively, while Latvia’s GDP growth rates for the same years were 
-  15,2, and 1 percent (see Sachs 1996).  In fact, it is difficult from figures 15.4 
and 15.5 in Kwan and Lui’s paper to infer whether one exchange rate regime 
is superior to the other. 
It seems that the eventual abolition of the first currency board system in the 
early 1970s was mainly caused by exogenous shocks such as the devaluation 
of sterling and the U.S. dollar, a large inflow of foreign capital to Hong Kong, 
and so on. This raises a question concerning the “permanency” of the current 
currency board system. If  similar shocks happen again, could the current ex- 
change rate regime be sustained even given the conditions described by Kwan 
and Lui? This issue deserves discussion in addition to the study of the viability 
of the regime. 
Other concerns are related to generalizing the experience of Hong Kong in 
adopting the currency board system, drawing lessons and policy implications 
for countries adopting the currency board system, examining critically under 
what circumstances a “permanent” pegged rate is appropriate, and so on. 
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